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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NAVARRO V. PFIZER CORPORA
TION: Too MUCH DISREGARD AND Too LITTLE DEFERENCE IN
DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT
INTRODUCTION
Consider this hypothetical situation: Company, Inc. employs
two individuals full-time with the same salary and benefits. Mr. Ri
vera has a 20-year-old daughter, home from college for the semes
ter recovering from a broken leg. Ms. Cho has a 35-year-old son,
paralyzed from an accident that has left him dependent on constant
care by home nurses. Both children contract pneumonia requiring
a week's stay in a hospital. Both parents request time off from
work to care for their children. The question facing their employer
is: Are both employees entitled to unpaid leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act?
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 19931 ("FMLA") allows
eligible employees2 to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to
care for a son or daughter with a "serious health condition."3 Con
gress defined a son or daughter as a child who is either (A) under
eighteen years old or (B) eighteen years of age or older and incapa
ble of self-care because of mental or physical disability.4 Because
they are older than eighteen, Mr. Rivera's and Ms. Cho's children
must be incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disa
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
2. The FMLA defines an eligible employee as one who has been employed for at
least twelve months by the employer and for at least 1250 hours of service during those
twelve months. § 2611(2)(A). The FMLA excludes federal officers and employees who
are covered by subchapter V of chapter 63 of Title 5, and employees whose employer
has fewer than 50 employees. § 2611(2)(B).
3. § 2612(1)(C). See infra Part I1LB for a discussion of the serious health condi
tion and the difference between it and a disability.
4. "The term son or daughter means a biological, adopted, or foster child,
stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is-(A)
under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because
of mental or physical disability." § 2611(12).
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bility to qualify for coverage under the Act. Congress did not, how
ever, define "disability" in the FMLA. Instead, it authorized the
Secretary of Labor to promulgate the regulations. s
Accordingly, the Secretary adopted the definition of disability
set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"):6 an im
pairment that substantially limits an individual's major life activi
ties.7 However, the Secretary did not directly define these terms.
The Secretary established their meaning by reference to the ADA
regulations, which were promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").8 These ADA regulations are
supplemented by the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance").9 Consequently, to decide whether Mr. Rivera and Ms.
Cho are entitled to leave, their employer must determine if either
of their adult children has a disability as defined under the FMLA.
However, consulting the FMLA regulations will only take the em
ployer so far. The employer must also look to the referenced ADA
regulations and the appended EEOC Interpretive Guidance, be
cause the meanings of the essential terms within the FMLA defini
tion of disability lie there.
In Navarro v. Pfizer Corporation,lO the First Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the meaning of disability in the context of the
FMLA. The court reviewed the situation of a mother-employee
whose adult daughter was bedridden for the last weeks of her preg
nancy and determined that the daughter's condition could meet
both the requirements of a serious health condition and incapable
of self-care because of disability. Thus, the court held that the
mother could be entitled to unpaid leave under the FMLA.11 In
reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit adopted a broad interpre
tation of disability as defined in the FMLA, allowing both Mr. Ri
vera and Ms. Cho to take unpaid leave to care for their children in
the hospitalP Despite each adult child's compelling situation, how
5.
6.

§ 2654.
42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
7. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000).
8. Regulations to Implement the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2 (h), (i), (j) (2000), referenced by 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2).
9. 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV, app. § 1630 (2000).
10. 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the question of the definition of
disability in the FMLA was an issue of first impression for the First Circuit and no other
Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue).
11. Id. at 104.
12. The hospitalization due to pneumonia qualifies as a serious health condition
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ever, Congress only intended Ms. Cho to be covered under the
FMLA.
This Note argues, in contrast to the First Circuit's holding, that
the language of the FMLA requires a narrower interpretation of
disability. The referenced ADA regulations require that a review
ing court consider three factors in determining whether a disability
exists, or more specifically, whether an impairment substantially
limits an individual in a major life activity. The three factors are
"the nature and severity of the impairment," the duration of the
impairment, and "the long-term impact ... resulting from the im
pairment."13 The Navarro court's interpretation of disability allows
a reviewing court to ignore the duration factor altogether, contrary
to the language of the regulations. This Note examines why review
ing courts cannot ignore any of the three factors if they follow the
language of the regulations.
Under the correct interpretation of the FMLA, Mr. Rivera's
daughter would not meet the definition of child because a broken
leg does not qualify as a disability. Ms. Cho's son, on the other
hand, would meet the definition of child under the FMLA. Ms.
Cho's son is paralyzed and depends on constant care; therefore, he
is disabled as defined in the referenced ADA regulations. In addi
tion, the son's pneumonia is a serious health condition as defined in
the FMLA regulations. Thus, only Ms. Cho is properly entitled to
unpaid leave to care for her son.
Part I of this Note explores the legislative history of the
FMLA, focusing on the restrictions imposed on employees seeking
leave to care for adult children. Part II outlines the views of the
majority and dissent in Navarro v. Pfizer Corporation. Part III dis
cusses why, in interpreting the FMLA, the First Circuit failed to
accord suitable deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADA regulations. This section includes a suggested line of inquiry
according to 29 u.s.c. § 2611(1l)(a), which defines serious health condition as "inpa
tient care in a hospital." Id. Ms. Cho's son is incapable of self-care because of his
physical disability (paralysis) and Mr. Rivera's daughter would also qualify because of
her physical disability (broken leg) as defined in the First Circuit's opinion in Navarro.
See infra Part II.A.
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). The regulations state:
The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individ
ual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
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for courts to pursue .when examining terms defined by reference to
another statute's regulations. Finally, the Note concludes by assert
ing that the majority's incorrect interpretation of the term disability
eliminates the restriction Congress intentionally imposed on leave
to care for children over age eighteen.
I.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE

ACT

OF

1993

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 began its legislative
journey to law as the Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985
("PDA").14 Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado spon~
sored the 'PDA with the goal of providing parents with four months
of unpaid leave to care for newborn or adopted children, and em
ployees with up to six months of unpaid leave for their own tempo
rary disabilities.IS In asserting the need for such an act,
Representative Schroeder once wrote: "A national family policy
should have three basic goals: to acknowledge the rich diversity of
American families; to protect the family's economic well-being; and
to provide families with flexible ways to meet their economic and
social needs."16 In 1987, Congress changed the name ofthe PDA to
the Family and Medical Leave ActP
A.

Evolution of the Act
The focus of the FMLA is family;IS many politicians and com

14. For a detailed account of the Parental and Disability Leave Act's journey to
becoming the Family and Medical Leave Act-the first legislation signed into law by
President Bill Clinton-see RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: How
CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW (1995).
15. 131 CONGo REC. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985).
16. Patricia Schroeder, Is There a Role for the Federal Government in Work and
the Family?, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 309 (1989).
17. H.R. 925, 100th Congo (1987).
18. The FMLA specifically states its purpose as being "to balance the demands of
the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security
of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity." The Fam
ily and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. § 2601(b)(I) (2000). For detailed descriptions of
the purpose of the FMLA and its provisions, see generally Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions
and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral Code Embedded in
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000); Jane Rigler,
Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,45 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 457 (1995); Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993:
A Survey of the Act's History, Purposes, Provisions, and Social Ramifications, 44
DRAKE L. REV. 51 (1995); Emily A. Hayes, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Work and
Family: Accomplishing the Goals of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1507 (2001); William R. Huffman, Comment, The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 and the Current State of Employee Protection: What Type of Protec
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menta tors have characterized the purpose of the Act as
"preserv[ing] the American Family."19 The earliest versions of the
FMLA only provided women with some "job-protected maternity
leave," as well as allowing fathers to take leave. 2o As Congress rec
ognized the conflicts American workers faced between their jobs
and families, it expanded the benefits of the FMLA. Gradually the
FMLA evolved to allow employees to take leave to care for their
children, spouses, and parents. Its evolution, however, took years.
Two significant areas in which the FMLA changed were the
number of weeks of leave provided and which family members
would be covered under the Act.2 1 In its earlier versions, the
FMLA granted employees up to sixteen weeks of unpaid leave to
care for newborn, adopted, or seriously ill children, and up to
twenty-four weeks of unpaid leave for the employees' own tempo
rary disabilities. 22 As the FMLA progressed through different Con
gresses, the number of weeks granted for leave decreased. 23
Furthermore, the first versions of the FMLA introduced in the Sen
ate and the House did not include provisions for spouses or parents,
focusing instead on leave for employees to take care of children or
of themselves. 24 Even medical leave to care for children was
limited.
The original versions of the FMLA introduced in both the Sen
ate and the House in 1985 did not include coverage for children
over eighteen.25 The provision for adult children who were "inca
pable of self-care because of mental or physical disability" was ad
ded to the House version in 1986,26 and the Senate version in
1988.27 What little there is in congressional reports about the provi
tion Can an Employee Expect upon Taking Work Leave for Family or Medical
Problems?, 15 MISS. C. L. REv. 97 (1994).
19. Craig, supra note 18, at 57.
20. 131 CONGo REc. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985).
21. ELVING, supra note 14, at 77.
22. 131 CONGo REC. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985). In all versions of the bills introduced,
both for the PDA and the FMLA, Congress uses the term "serious health condition";
only in commentary is the term "temporary disabilities" used.
23. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1164 (2002)
(stating that the FMLA only requires twelve weeks of unpaid leave, a period chosen as
a "result of compromise between groups with marked but divergent interests").
24. H.R. 2020, 99th Congo (1985); H.R. 4300, 99th Congo (1986); S. 2278, 99th
Congo (1986); S. 249, l00th Congo (1987).
25. Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Congo (1985); S.
2278, 99th Congo (1986) ("a bill to grant employees parental and temporary medical
leave").
26. H.R. 4300.
27. Parental and Temporary Medical Leave Act of 1988, S. 2278, 99th Congo
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sions for parents to take leave to care for adult children indicates
that Congress contemplated circumstances where an adult child's
condition "presents the same compelling need for parental care" as
a minor child's condition. 28
The bill thus recognizes that in special circumstances, where a
child has a mental or physical disability, a child's need for paren
tal care may not end when he or she reaches eighteen years of
age. In such circumstances, parents may continue to have an ac
tive role in caring for the son or daughter.29

Congress also acknowledged the reality that not all children
achieve independence when they reach the age of eighteen: 3o "The
percentage of adults in the care of their working children or parents
due to physical and mental disabilities is growing."31 Like minor
children, adult children who are incapable of self-care because of
mental or physical disabilities are vulnerable and in special need of
their parents' time and attention. Currently, more parents are
choosing to care for their disabled adult children at home rather
than institutionalizing them. 32 For working parents caring for these
particular adult children, the responsibility creates tension between
work demands and family needs that parents with self-sufficient
(1986). The initial version of the FMLA introduced in the Senate did not include adult
children. The bill only allowed employees to take time off for their own serious health
condition, or the serious health condition of a minor child. During the 100th Congress,
the FMLA was sent to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. While in
Committee, one of the members, Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, proposed
that the definition of child be expanded to include over 18 years of age and incapable of
self-care because of mental or physical disability. 134 CONGo REC. S25,643 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dodd). That Senator Weicker introduced this lan
guage is noteworthy because he has a child with Down's Syndrome. Also, while Gover
nor of Connecticut, he was instrumental in bringing the World Special Olympics to
Connecticut. In explaining the amendment to the FMLA, Senator Christopher Dodd
of Connecticut stated that the amendment "would redefine or add to the definition of
son or daughter ... a dependent child, a mentally retarded child over the age of 18 who
was still a dependent." Id.; see also ELVING, supra note 14, at 77.
28. H.R. REp. No. 103-8, pt. 1-3, at 34 (1993); Navarro V. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d
90, 106 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Congress wanted to restrict leave benefits for parents to care
for their adult children 18 and older to only those special cases where because of some
mental or physical disability the adult child is ... especially dependent on the parent in
the same ways minor children are typically dependent.").
29. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, at 34.
30. Id.
31. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
32. Id. This trend stems in part from the fact that "removing people from a home
environment has been shown to be costly and often detrimental to the health and well
being of persons with mental and physical disabilities." Id.
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adult children do not face. 33 Thus, Congress granted employee-par
ents of dependent adult children who develop serious health condi
tions the same flexibility for work leave that the FMLA grants to
employee-parents of minor children.
In 1989, Congress added spouses and parents to the language
of the FMLA.34 These provisions contain no age restrictions. 35 At
no time, however, did a version of the FMLA include grandparents,
siblings, or other relatives. 36 The final version of the law granted
twelve weeks unpaid leave for both the care of a child, spouse, or
parent, and for employees to manage their own temporary disabili
ties. The legislative journey of the FMLA took eight years because
of a lack of support from the president. Both the Senate and the
House passed the FMLA three times, but President George H.W.
Bush twice vetoed it. In both instances, Congress was unable to
override the vetoes. However, after its third passage in 1993, Presi
dent Bill Clinton signed the FMLA into law. 37
B.

Implementation of the Act

The FMLA specifically delegates authority to the Secretary of
Labor to prescribe the regulations necessary to administer it. 38 As
required under the notice-and-comment section of the Administra
tive Procedure Act ("APA"),39 the Secretary published a request
for comments on issues to be addressed in drafting the regulations
33. Id. at 9. "While preferable, independent living situations can result in in
creased responsibilities for family members, who by necessity are also wage earners.
Home care, while laudable, can also add to the tension between work demands and
family needs." Id.
34. Id.
35. The definitions of "parent" and "spouse" do not reference age for either rela
tive. The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 V.S.c. § 2611(7), (13) (2000). Further
more, in a House Report of the 103rd Congress, Congress commented that "[a]n
employee could also take leave to care for a parent or spouse of any age" who met the
requirement of a serious health condition. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1-3, at 36 (1993).
36. Grandparents or siblings who function in a parenting capacity for an em
ployee or a child would be covered in the FMLA. The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 29 V.S.c. § 2611(7) (2000).
37. Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457, 459 (1995).
38. 29 V.S.C § 2654. The Secretary designated the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor's Employment Standards Administration as the agency re
sponsible for administering and enforcing the FMLA. Implementation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 13,394 (Mar. 10,1993).
39. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 V.S.C § 553(b)(1)-(3) (2000) (stating that
"[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law").
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for the FMLA.40 With respect to defining disability, the Secretary
posed this question to the public: "What meaning, if any, should the
regulations give to the term 'incapable of self-care because of
mental or physical disability'?"41
Three months later, on June 4, 1993, the Secretary published
interim regulations for the FMLA, along with comments as to how
the· regulations had been formulated. 42 In choosing the definition
of disability, the Secretary had examined the Social Security Act,
Medicare, and the ADA.43 Ultimately, the interim FMLA regula
tions borrowed the exact language from the ADA regulations for
the definition of disability. However, to explain the terms used in
the definition, the Secretary referenced the appropriate ADA regu
lations, rather then borrowing the language as she had done to de
fine disability.44
In addition to publishing the interim regulations, the Secretary
made a request for additional comments before the final regula
tions were scheduled to take effect. 45 The final regulations, which
took effect on April 6, 1995, varied little from the interim regula
tions.46 The definition of disability remained the same, as did the
reference to the ADA regulations. 47 Appended to the ADA regu
lations, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance serves to clarify the
40. Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg.
13,394 (Mar. 10, 1993).
41. Id. at 13,395.
42. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,799 (June
4, 1993).
43. Id. The commentary does not specify why the ADA's definition of disability
was chosen over the Social Security Act's or Medicare's definition.
44. Id.
.
45. Id. at 31,794.
46. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000);
see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2244 (Jan. 6,
1995); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,817 (June 4,
1993). The only difference between the interim and final regulations is that the interim
regulations reference 29 C.F.R. § 1630 and the final regulations confine the reference
regulations to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(j). In this respect, one could argue that the ADA
definition of disability is stricter than the FMLA definition because, for instance, under
the entire regulatory part of the ADA current illegal use of drugs cannot qualify as a
disability whereas it could under the FMLA's restricted reference to the ADA regula
tions. However, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance under dispute relates to the
specific regulations referenced in the FMLA regulations, this difference is academic.
For a discussion of the final FMLA regulations, see generally Terry A.M. Mumford
& George A. Norwood, Final ReguLations Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 and Other Recent DeveLopments, SB11 ALI-ABA 151 (1996) (study outline);
Michelle D. Bayer, Alan M. Kanter & Michael R. Shpiece, The Family and Medical
Leave Act: The Final Regulations, 28 URB. LAW. 93 (1996).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)-(j) (2002).
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meamng of "substantially limits" as defined III the ADA
regulations. 48
The controversy in Navarro centers around this reference to
the ADA regulations and the appended EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance. In this interpretive guidance, the EEOC asserts that "tem
porary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no
long-term impact or permanent impact, are usually not disabili
ties."49 The Navarro court accepted as legitimate the FMLA regu
lations' reference to the ADA regulations. 50 However, the question
of what deference to accord to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance
became one of the main issues dividing the majority and dissent and
underlies their disparate interpretations of the term "disability."
II.

NAVARRO V. PFIZER CORPORATION

The Navarro case reached the First Circuit on appeal from the
district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defen
dant. Plaintiff Gh;tdys Navarro-Pomares ("Ms. Navarro") worked
for Pfizer Corporation ("Pfizer") as a full-time secretary from 1994
through 1997. 51 In October 1997, Ms. Navarro requested a "leave
of absence" to care for her pregnant daughter;52 she intended the
leave to extend through November and December of 1997. As is
required under the FMLA, Ms. Navarro provided certification from
her daughter's doctor, attesting that her daughter was bedridden for
the final weeks of her pregnancy due to high blood pressure. Pfizer
determined that the daughter's medical condition did not satisfy the
requirements of the FMLA and refused to grant Ms. Navarro any
leave. 53 Nonetheless, Ms. Navarro took leave from work to care for
her daughter. When she failed to report to work, Pfizer terminated
Ms. Navarro, notifying her in writing on November 11, 1997. 54
Shortly thereafter, she filed suit against Pfizer. 55
48. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2002) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Ameri
cans with Disabilities Act).
49. Id. at app. § 1630.2(j).
50. Navarro-Pomares v. Pfizer Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (D.P.R. 2000), rev'd
261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001).
51. Id. at 209.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Pfizer's Human Resources Manager had notified Ms. Navarro on Novem
ber 6,1997, that if she did not report to work on Monday, November 9,1997, she could
be terminated.
55. Id.; see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c.
§ 2617(a)(2) (2000) (authorizing plaintiffs to sue in federal court).
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In her complaint, Ms. Navarro alleged that Pfizer violated the
FMLA by refusing to grant her leave to care for her daughter. Pfi
zer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Ms.
Navarro's daughter did not fit the definition of child as defined in
the FMLA regulations. 56 The district court concluded that accord
ing to the FMLA regulations, Ms. Navarro's daughter "must be an
'individual with a disability' within the scope of the ADA. "57 In
construing the ADA definition of disability, the district court con
sidered the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 58
Relying on the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the district court
concluded that the high blood pressure of Ms. Navarro's daughter
was "a 'temporary, non-chronic impairment ... of short duration,
with little or no long term or permanent impact."59 Consequently,
the court held that Ms. Navarro's daughter's condition did not
amount to a disability, and Ms. Navarro's request for leave was not
covered under the FMLA.60 Accordingly, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Pfizer. On appeal, the First Circuit
overturned the district court's decision.
A.

First Circuit Majority

In overturning the district court's holding, Judge Bruce Selya,
writing for the majority, rejected the lower court's reliance on the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance, which sets forth factors 61 to be
weighed in determining the existence of a disability.62 The majority
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine what deference, if any,
courts should give the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 63 In addition,
56. Daughter is defined in § 2611(12) of the FMLA as "18 years of age or older
and incapable of self-care because of ... disability." 29 U.S.c. § 2611(12)(B). Pfizer
argued that because Ms. Navarro's daughter was not incapable of self-care because of a
disability, she did not satisfy the definition of daughter. Thus, as the district court said,
"The issue, strangely enough, is whether [Ms. Navarro's daughter] qualifies as a 'daugh
ter' under the FMLA." Navarro, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
57. Navarro, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
58. [d.
59. [d. at 214 (quoting The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(h) (2000) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act».
60.

[d.

61. The factors are the severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impair
ment. 29 c.F.R. § 1630.2U)(2)(i)-(iii) (2002) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
62. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2001). See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
63. [d. at 99-101.
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it considered the administrative and judicial history of the ADA.64
Finding the administrative and judicial history of the ADA inappli
cable to the FMLA,65 the court determined that the term disability
had a broader meaning within the context of the FMLA than within
the context of the ADA.66 Finally, the court constructed a three
part rule for courts to use in determining the existence of a disabil
ity under the FMLA.67
Because the First Circuit was reviewing the district court's
grant of summary judgment, the first question before the court was
whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact. 68 The court
had to decide whether a trier of fact could reasonably find that Ms.
Navarro's daughter met the requirements of the FMLA. Therefore,
to meet the requirements, the court needed to find Ms. Navarro's
daughter incapable of self-care because of mental or physical disa
bility, and suffering from a serious health condition. 69 The court
analyzed whether Ms. Navarro's daughter arguably had a "serious
health condition" and was "incapable of self-care."70 The court de
termined that the daughter easily satisfied both statutory provi
sionsJl The majority then turned to the "nub of the case": the
definition of disabilityJ2
As stated earlier, the FMLA regulations define disability as an
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi
ties of an individual.73 The court first evaluated the definitions of
the terms "impairment" and "major life activity."74 In brief discus
64.

Id. at lOI.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 102-03.
67. Id. at 104.
68. Id. at 93.
69. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2611(11)-(12),
2612(a)(I)(C) (2000).
70. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 95-96.
71. [d. The daughter's incapacity due to her pregnancy satisfied the requirement
of a serious health condition; the doctor's directive that the daughter remain in bed for
the duration of her pregnancy satisfied the requirement of being incapable of self-care.
The court cites Pendarvis v. Xerox Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998), for the
proposition that any pregnancy-related incapacity constitutes a serious health condition.
For discussions on the meaning of serious health condition in the FMLA, see generally
Kelly Druten, The Family and Medical Leave Act: What Constitutes a Serious Health
Condition?, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 183 (1997); Paula F. Wolff, What Constitutes "Serious
Health Condition" Under § 101(11) or § 102(A) (1)(D) of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 169 A.L.R. FED. 369 (2001).
72. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96.
73. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2002).
74. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96-98. These terms come from the EEOC Interpretive
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sions, the court determined that there was a genuine issue of mate~
rial fact over the existence of an impairment (the daughter's high
blood pressure 7S ) and the impact of the impairment on a major life
activity (the daughter's inability to care for herself or her children
while bedridden76). Thus, the "crux" of the dispute, according to
the majority, lay in whether the daughter's condition was arguably
"substantially limiting."77 .
For the majority, the district court's error lay in its reliance on
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance: "In holding that a 'temporary
non-chronic impairment' did not constitute a disability, the lower
court relied entirely on an EEOC interpretive guidance ..., thereby
implicitly if not explicitly granting Chevron deference to the
EEOC's interpretation of its own rules."78 The court objected to
this because it believed Chevron deference 79 to the EEOC's inter
pretations of the ADA regulations is not appropriate in the FMLA
context. 80 According to the court, for Chevron deference to apply,
a federal statute must vest an agency with authority to promulgate
rules with the force of law. 81 However, Congress did not grant au
thority to the EEOC to promulgate regulations pursuant to the
FMLA; the Secretary of Labor has the sole authority to do SO.82
Thus, the majority held that Chevron deference was unwarranted
and that the district court erred in granting such deference to the
Guidance for the ADA, defining disability as an impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2).
75. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 97 ("[T]here is at least a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether appellant's daughter'S high blood pressure constitutes an impairment under
the ADA.").
76. /d. ("[T]he appellant has made a sufficient showing, for summary judgment
purposes, on the 'major life activity' prong.").
77. Id.
78. Id. at 98.
79. See infra note 126-133 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 99.
81. /d. at 98. The highest level of deference a court can give an agency interpreta
tion is Chevron deference. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. De! Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court created a two-prong test for courts to follow when
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute. First, courts must determine whether
Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue. Id. at 842. Where the statute is
ambiguous, and the agency involved has rule-making authority from Congress under
the statute, then courts must determine if the agency's answer is a permissible construc
tion of the statute. Id. at 843. If the agency's construction is reasonable, then the regu
lations "are given controlling weight." Id. at 844. Agency regulations will not merit
Chevron deference if they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat
ute." /d.
82. 29 U.S.c. § 2654; Navarro, 261 FJd at 99.
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EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 83
The majority went on to discuss what, if any, level ofdeference
might apply to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance in the FMLA con
text For example, under the Skidmore doctrine, the court could
give the EEOC Interpretive Guidance persuasive force if it is "in
harmony with the statute and the regulations."84 However, the
court determined that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not
meant to apply in the FMLA context85 and was inconsistent with
the purpose of the FMLA.86 Therefore, the court determined that
reviewing courts should not award any deference to the EEOC In
terpretive Guidance in interpreting the term disability in the FMLA
context. 87 Since it owed no deference, the court determined that it
may look elsewhere to determine the FMLA meaning of
"disability."
The majority outlined two primary reasons for deciding that
the meaning of disability in the FMLA context should differ from
its meaning in the ADA context To begin with, the concept of dis
ability serves a "much different function in the ADA than in the
FMLA."88 The determination of disability is essential in the ADA
context because it establishes whether the individual qualifies for its
statutory protections. 89 In the FMLA context, however, the deter
mination .of disability is only relevant when an employee seeks
leave to care for an adult child; the determination is irrelevant when
the employee requests leave to care for a minor child, a spouse, a
parent, or him-or herself. 90 Also, "the FMLA deals with lower
levels of employer engagement and employee rewards than does
the ADA":91 under the FMLA the maximum annual benefit is
twelve weeks of unpaid leave, while the ADA requires reasonable
accommodations for an indefinite period of time.92
The court found these differences determinative in concluding
83. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99.
84. Id. (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 99 F.3d 991, 996 (10th Cir.
1996». Skidmore deference requires that courts accord a "power to persuade" to an
agency's interpretation of a statute. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of Skidmore deference.
85. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100.
86. Id. at 101.
87. Id. at 104.
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 102.
92. Id.
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that disability in the FMLA context was meant to be less stringent
than in the ADA context. For the First Circuit, this difference be
tween ADA disability and FMLA disability should manifest itself in
how courts balance the three factors outlined in the referenced
ADA regulation: the severity, duration, and long-term or perma
nent impact of the impairment. 93 Whereas the ADA context may
require that all three factors be given similar or equal considera
tion, the FMLA context requires that the "trio of factors-particu
larly duration-[ ] be treated somewhat differently."94
The First Circuit constructed a tripartite rule for future deter
minations of whether an adult child's condition meets the require
ment of disability under the FMLA.95 First, reviewing courts
should ignore the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 96 Second, courts
should evaluate all relevant factors, including the three EEOC fac
tors, on a case-by-case basis. 97 Third, only the severity of the im
pairment is indispensable to a finding of disability.98 This third
prong is what differentiates an FMLA inquiry from an ADA in
quiry: in the ADA context, the duration and long-term impact fac
tors are also indispensable.
Applying this rule, the majority concluded that there existed a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Navarro's daugh
ter's condition satisfied the definition of disability.99 Because the
severity of the daughter's condition could be controlling in the anal
ysis, the absence of the duration and long-term impact factors
would not necessarily foreclose a trier of fact from determining that
the daughter's impairment was substantially limiting enough to con
stitute a disability.

B. Judge Campbell's Dissent
Senior Judge Levin Campbell opposed both the majority's
analysis and its conclusion. In his dissenting opinion, he accused
the majority of overriding the authority granted to the Secretary of
Labor and substituting its own judicial discretion. lOo Judge Camp
bell concluded, based on statutory construction and legislative his
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 103.
Id. at lOI.
Id. at 104.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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tory, that the term disability in the FMLA context has as restrictive
a definition as it does in the ADA context. lOl In addition, he found
that the Secretary of Labor intended to co-opt the ADA's regula
tions and its concomitant EEOC Interpretive Guidance, as is the
Secretary's prerogative pursuant to authority granted by
Congress. 102
Drawing on the language of the statute and regulations, as well
as the legislative history of the FMLA, Judge Campbell determined
that Congress imbued the term disability with "a serious and severe
consequence."103 He began with the words of the statute,104 "inca
pable of self-care because of ... disability," and found that they
"impose[d] a significant limitation upon the class of adult children
for whose care parental leave is mandated."105 The limitation is not
imposed on minor children, spouses, or parents. Judge Campbell
found this added a significant burden and chastised the majority for
ignoring or diminishing it. I06
Furthermore, he found that the legislative history evinced Con
gress' intent to restrict leave benefits for parents seeking to care for
adult children.107 The leave is restricted to special cases where an
adult child is as dependent on his or her parent as a minor child
would be. "Congress contemplated an adult child who is especially
dependent over some period of time on parental care for physical
or mental reasons."I08 Judge Campbell determined that the con
struction of the language and the legislative history led to the con
clusion that disability was meant to have a narrow and strict
meaning in the FMLA.
The dissent also offered reasons why the term disability should
be interpreted to have the same meaning in both the ADA and the
FMLA. In referencing the ADA's regulations, the Secretary of La
bor "construed the terms precisely in accord with the congressional
intent one would glean from the construction of the statute and the
Senate Report."!09 By cross-referencing the FMLA regulations
and the ADA regulations, "the Secretary makes use of interpreta
tions developed and being developed in another relevant on-going
101. Id. at 108 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
103. /d. at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 105-06 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 106 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
109. /d. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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regulatory scheme."110 This supported the dissent's contention,
contrary to the majority's assumption, that the Secretary did intend
to adopt the EEOC Interpretative Guidance of the ADA regula
tions when she adopted the ADA's language. Also, employing the
same interpretation of disability for both the ADA and the FMLA
would provide good guidance for employers because they could
rely on already established administrative and judicial history.1 11
Finally, the dissent found that, even under the majority's own
test, Ms. Navarro's daughter's condition would not meet the FMLA
definition of disability. Though the majority's tripartite rule down
played the significance of the duration and long-term impact fac
tors, those factors remained relevant to the inquiry. Yet, Judge
Campbell argued, the only way the majority could conclude that the
daughter's condition satisfied the regulation was by giving little
weight to the duration and long-term impact factors.112 In ignoring
those two factors, the majority was, in essence, ignoring the lan
guage of the regulation. Furthermore, the majority's tripartite rule
permitted situations where the same language from the same regu
lations could have a different meaning and result depending on
whether a court is looking at the language in the FMLA context or
the ADA context.1 13 Thus, the majority failed to engage in any of
the "balancing" it directed other courts to follow in future cases. 114
Judge Campbell thus concluded that the majority was engaging in
"unwonted activism" in overturning the district court's decision and
forming a different rule for determining the existence of a disability
in the FMLA context. 115
III.

DETERMINING DEFERENCE AND DEFINING DISABILITY

In reviewing statutory regulations, courts must first determine
what level of deference they owe to an agency's regulations. If a
reviewing court owes a high level of deference, then it must apply
the regulations as written so long as they are not manifestly con
trary to the underlying statute. If, on the other hand, the court
owes no deference, then it may apply standard canons of interpreta
tion to the statute. The two issues the First Circuit confronted in
Navarro, what deference was owed the EEOC Interpretive Gui
110.

111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 108 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
(Campbell, J., dissenting).
(Campbell, J., dissenting).
at 109 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
at 111 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
at 113 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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dance and the appropriate definition of disability, were resolved er
roneously. Section A will demonstrate that the First Circuit, in
considering the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, failed to accord the
EEOC the appropriate deference. Section B will conclude that
standard rules of statutory interpretation and the legislative history
of the FMLA both confirm that the term "disability" should be in
terpreted narrowly and that courts should not be free to ignore du
ration when weighing the factors used to define disability.
A.

The .Question of Deference

The Navarro court's tripartite rule allows a reviewing court to
discard the EEOC Interpretive Guidance when determining which
impairments meet the requirements of a disability. Before replac
ing an agency's interpretation with one of its own construction, a
court must first determine what level of deference, if any, it owes to
the agency's interpretation of its enabling statute and its properly
promulgated regulations. 116 In its conclusion not to grant the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance any deference, the Navarro court ex
amined two principal doctrines of deference, the Skidmore· stan
dard, and the Chevron standard of deference.
The Skidmore standard of deference was' first articulated by
the Supreme Court in 1944. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 117 involved an
agency's interpretation of "working time" under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.1 18 The district and appellate courts both rejected
the agency's interpretation that "working time" included time fire
house employees spent waiting to respond to alarms. 119 In remand
ing the case for further proceedings, the Supreme Court instructed
the lower court to more carefully consider the soundness of the
agency's interpretation. 120 Because agency' interpretations are
"based upon more specialized experience and broaderinvestiga
tions and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particu
116. For a discussion of the deference owed to administrative interpretations of
statutes and regulations, see generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612
(1996); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architec
ture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defer
ence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. .
117. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
118. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (2000).
119. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136.
120. Id. at 140.
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lar case,"121 judges should assign agency interpretations a "power to
persuade" the court on the matter before it.l 22 Under the Skid
more standard, an agency's interpretation warrants consideration,
akin to the weight of legislative history, in the court's determination
of the meaning of a statute.u3 Nonetheless, ultimate interpretive
authority rests with the courts under the Skidmore doctrine. 124
In 1984, the Supreme Court curtailed judicial authority to sub
stitute its judgment for that of agencies. 125 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,126 the Supreme Court
reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") inter
pretation of the term "stationary source" from the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977,127 The specific issue before the Court was
"whether the Court of Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous
judgment on the validity of the regulations."128 The Court held that
the EPA's definition was a "permissible construction of the statute"
and, therefore, entitled to deference. 129
In holding that the EPA's construction of the statute was enti
tled to deference, the Supreme Court announced a two-part test for
determining whether an agency's interpretation of a statute de
serves the highest level of deference. 13o The first part requires the
121. Id. at 139.
122. With regard to how to evaluate whether an agency's interpretation deserves
deference under the "power to persuade" standard, the Supreme Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administra
tor under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the. validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
123. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretation Should Bind Citizens and
the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1990) ("[T]he agency interpretation is a substan
tial input and counts for something, much as legislative history may count. But the
authoritative act of interpretation remains with the court. ").
124. Id. See also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989), reprinted in PETER H.
SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (1994).
125. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Ad
ministrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002).
126. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
127. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
129. Id. at 866.
130. Id. at 842-43. At least one commentator has characterized the test as a
three-part test. The first part addresses the same issue, whether Congress has spoken
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reviewing court to determine whether the statute is ambiguous: "If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."131 The second part requires the re
viewing court to determine "whether the agency's [interpretation] is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."132 Thus, under
the Chevron doctrine, if Congress has bestowed authority on an
agency to promulgate regulations for a particular statute, "a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation ... of an agencyP3
Skidmore and Chevron are the two seminal deference stan
dards.134 Part One will examine the application of Chevron defer
ence to the FMLA regulations, the referenced ADA regulations,
and the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. Part Two will analyze the
application of Skidmore deference to the same. Finally, Part Three
will explore what, if any, other levels of deference courts could use
when evaluating a situation in which an agency's regulations refer
ence another agency's regulations. 135

directly on the issue. The second part of the test asks whether Congress has delegated
authority to the agency to "elucidate by regulation." Finally, the court evaluates rea
sonableness of the agency's construction. Anthony, supra note 123, at 17.
131. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Step one involves the reviewing court inter
preting the statute "only so far as is necessary to determine whether there is clear and
unambiguous congressional intent toward the precise question. The court may employ
the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' to ascertain the existence of such an
intent." Anthony, supra note 123, at 18.
132. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
133. /d. at 844. "To be sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need
not be the only permissible one, and if reasonable it will be upheld even though the
court might have construed the statute differently." Anthony, supra note 123, at 27.
134. Some courts and commentators consider Skidmore deference to be super
seded by Chevron. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that "Skidmore deference to author
itative agency views is an anachronism" and Chevron put an end to that era); Eric R.
Womack, Into the Third Era ofAdministrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK L. REv.
289, 302 (2002) (describing the debate over the validity of Skidmore deference post
Chevron).
However, the Supreme Court resurrected Skidmore deference in the 2000 Chris
tensen decision. 529 U.S. at 587 (stating that interpretations of statutes contained in
opinion letter are entitled to Skidmore deference); see infra note 149-152 and accompa
nying text (discussing Skidmore deference).
135. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recognized "more than one
variety of judicial deference." U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2000). See infra
Part III.A.3.
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Chevron Deference

The First Circuit implicitly determined that the Secretary of
Labor's FMLA regulations, including the definition of disability in
section 825.1l3(c)(2),136 merited the highest level of deference
under Chevron.1 37 However, the First Circuit declined to extend
this deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance appended to the
referenced ADA regulations. Under the Chevron doctrine, the
court should have given the EEOC Interpretive Guidance Chevron
deference.
Congress explicitly granted the Secretary of Labor the author
ity to promulgate rules in § 2654 of the FMLA.1 38 Since Congress
did not define the term disability, thereby resulting in ambiguity,
the Secretary had the authority to do so. Consequently, under
Chevron, unless the Secretary's interpretation of the term disability
is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"
which it is not-then the Secretary's definition of disability must
stand.1 39 There may be other, equally reasonable, interpretations of
the term "disability." However, as long as the interpretation cho
sen by the Secretary of Labor is not "arbitrary, capricious, or mani
festly contrary to" the language of the FMLA, the regulations
warrant Chevron deference.
The majority in Navarro characterized the Secretary's defini
tion of disability (an "impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of an individual") as "reasona
ble."140 Though the majority then went on to characterize the Sec
retary's reference to the ADA regulations for the definition of the
136. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
137. The court recognized that Congress delegated authority to promulgate regu
lations for the FMLA to the Secretary of Labor. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90,
99 (1st Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the court found that the Secretary's definition of disa
bility for the FMLA was reasonable. Id. at 96 (stating that the Secretary "reasonably
concluded that a disability is an 'impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of an individual' ").
138. "The Secretary of Labor shall prescribe such regulations as are neces
sary ...." The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C § 2654 (2000).
139. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The First Circuit characterized the Secretary's
definition of disability as "reasonable." Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96. Cf Ragsdale v. Wol
verine Worldwide Corp., 535 U.S. 81,86 (2002) ("[t]he Secretary's judgment that a par
ticular regulation fits within [the] statutory constraint [of the FMLA] must be given
considerable weight" and invalidating the Secretary's regulations, which required em
ployers to notify employees whether their leave time counts toward FMLA leave in
advance of the employee taking the leave, because the regulations were manifestly con
trary to the statute).
140. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (1993».
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terms as "abjur[ing] any independent effort," the court accepted the
ADA regulations as controlling the inquiry for determining the ex
istence of a disability under the FMLA.141 Thus, the First Circuit
implicitly determined that the referenced ADA regulations were a
reasonable interpretation of the intent of Congress with respect to
the definition of the "disability."
Nonetheless, the dispute over the degree of deference arises
because the Secretary of Labor did not adopt a completely indepen
dent definition of disability. Rather, she incorporated the ADA
definition. However, the act of referencing itself, and thereby
referencing the ADA regulations, also warrants Chevron deference.
The First Circuit focused on when the EEOC Interpretive Gui- .
dance was first written in evaluating its appropriateness in the
FMLA context. The court determined that because the EEOC
"never had any authority to promulgate regulations pursuant to the
FMLA,"142 its Interpretive Guidance was not entitled to any defer
ence.1 43 Focusing on the power of the EEOC and when the Inter
pretive Guidance was issued is the incorrect frame of reference.
Instead, the appropriate avenue of analysis should focus on the fact
that the Interpretive Guidance already existed when the Secretary
referenced the ADA regulations for the FMLA.
When the Secretary published the interim regulations for the
FMLA, they contained the reference to the ADA regulations. At
that time, the ADA regulations included the appended EEOC In
terpretive Guidance. After the required notice-and-comment pro
cedures, the final FMLA regulations formalized the reference to
the ADA regulations into a rule under the FMLA. The First Cir
cuit stated that "[ e ]ven if the Secretary adopts certain EEOC rules
as her own ... she does not automatically adopt the EEOC's infor
mal interpretations of those rules."l44 To the contrary, since the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance existed at the time the FMLA regula
tions went through the notice-and-comment procedures, the court
should presume that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was incorpo
rated in the referenced ADA regulations. Thus, Chevron deference
is warranted to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance in the FMLA
context for two reasons: 145 first, the Secretary properly promul
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
144. Id.
145. In the ADA context, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance may not warrant any
deference. In Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court stated that "interpret a
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gated the FMLA regulations including the referenced ADA rules
and interpretive guidance, as required by the APA's notice and com
ment procedures;146 second, the referenced regulations are not an
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary interpretation of the
FMLA.147
Thus, despite the First Circuit's belief that the Secretary
"caught the clearest way," the Secretary correctly and thoroughly
determined that the ADA terms and definitions best effectuated
the congressional intent, 148 and the court should have deferred to
the Secretary's choice of definition for the term "disability." Even
if Chevron deference was not warranted, however, the ADA regu
lations, including the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, warrant Skid
more deference.
2.

Skidmore Deference

In contrast to an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute,
an agency'f: interpretation of its own regulations is not entitled to
Chevron deference. The Supreme Court held in Christensen v.
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of
which lack the force of law" do not warrant Chevron deference. 529 U.S. 576, 578
(2000); see infra note 149 (discussing the Christensen case). Furthermore, the Interpre
tive Guidance at issue in Navarro pertains to a section of the ADA under which no
agency has the authority to issue regulations. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 479 (1999). The EEOC has the authority to "issue regulations to carry out the
employment provisions in Title I of the ADA, §§ 12111-12117." Id. at 478. In Sutton,
the Supreme Court left open the question of what deference, if any, is due to the EEOC
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630. Id. at 480; see Black v. Roadway Ex
press, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 449 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that there is no need to
determine what deference is owed to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance because it is
not necessary to decide the case); see also infra note 168 (discussion the facts of Sutton).
However, what deference is owed to the Interpretive Guidance in the ADA con
text is not relevant to the determination of the deference owed to it in the FMLA
context. As this Note argues, the Secretary of Labor properly promulgated the regula
tions for the FMLA, including the reference to the ADA regulations and the appended
EEOC Interpretive Guidance. The interim FMLA regulations were published in the
Federal Register, as required under the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA,
and those interim regulations also contained the reference to the ADA regulations.
146. The Secretary's reference to the ADA regulations went through the notice
and comment procedure with the rest of the regulations, as required by Congress.
APA, 5 U.S.c. § 553(b) (1996) (directing agencies to publish general notice of rule
making in the Federal Register and to provide interested parties with an opportunity to
participate in the rule-making). For a detailed explanation of how the FMLA regula
tions went through notice-and-comment procedures, see supra note 39 and accompany
ing text and Part I.B.
147. See Part III.A.l for a discussion of the Chevron standard of deference.
148. See Part LA, .B.
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Harris County 149 that interpretations of statutes contained in policy
statements, opinion letters, agency manuals, and enforcement guid
ances do not merit Chevron deference. 15o Instead, they are entitled
to Skidmore deference: 151 these informal interpretations are ac
corded respect and have the power to persuade. 152 Thus, if the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance is characterized in the FMLA context
as a guideline appended to the referenced ADA regulations (rather
than a rule that went through the mandated rulemaking procedures
under the APA) , then the court should apply Skidmore deference
to the Interpretive Guidance. 153
In Navarro, after the majority held that it did not owe Chevron
deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the court turned to
the Skidmore standard of deference. 154 In the process, the First
Circuit misapplied the Skidmore doctrine in determining that the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance was unpersuasive. 155 The court re
149. 529 u.s. 576, 587 (2000). In Christensen, the Supreme Court evaluated
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 u.s.c. § 201 (2000), pre
cluded a state from unilaterally adopting a compensatory time policy. The Department
of Labor asserted that the FLSA precluded the state's policy. In deciding what defer
ence to accord the Secretary's interpretation, the Court concluded that deference was
not warranted where the language of the statute was not ambiguous. Christensen, 529
U.S. at 588. In the process, the Court reviewed various standards of deference. See
generally Naaman Asir Fiola, Christensen v. Harris: Pumping Chevron For All It's
Worth-Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDGES 151
(2001).
150. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
151. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (holding that an agency inter
pretation of a statute had the "power to persuade" a court); see supra notes 117-124
(discussing the facts and holding of Skidmore).
152. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
153. There are varying ways to interpret Supreme Court precedent on whether
informal agency interpretations ever warrant Chevron deference. See Womack, supra
note 134, at 318-19 (stating that there are at least three ways that courts have inter
preted U.S. v. Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001». Some courts interpret Mead as "limiting
the scope of Chevron to formal actions" only. Id. at 318. Other courts view Mead as
requiring them to evaluate "the adequacy of the procedural protections provided by the
agency in issuing an interpretation." Id. at 319. The Navarro court falls into the former
group. Id. at 330 ("The court [in Navarro] understood the Supreme Court's language in
Mead to require little deference to informal actions even before the court began to look
at the persuasiveness of the interpretation.").
154. For one commentator, a court's application of Skidmore deference signals
the overturning of the agency interpretation because the court will not accord the
agency any deference at all. Womack, supra note 134, at 307 ("Skidmore deference, at
least in its application to post-Chevron informal actions, appeared to mean no defer
ence at all. ").
155. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2001). In reviewing the
Navarro court's application of the Skidmore doctrine, one scholar criticized the court's
reasoning in not granting deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, stating, "[The]

286

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:263

lied upon three main arguments to support its determination that
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance did not deserve Skidmore defer
ence: 1) the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not written to inter
pret the FMLA; 2) Supreme Court precedent in ADA cases
supports this position; and 3) the FMLA and the ADA serve differ
ence purposes. However, all three arguments fail upon close
scrutiny.
The first argument asserted that the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance could never satisfy the Skidmore persuasion standard be
cause it was not created to interpret FMLA regulations. The court
determined that, since the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was writ
ten over three years before Congress passed the FMLA, Congress
never intended it to apply in the FMLA context. 156 Furthermore,
the majority stated that, as the only EEOC Interpretive Guidance
to apply in the FMLA context, it is "idiosyncratic."157 Finally, the
court pointed out that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance never went
through notice-and-comment rulemaking in the FMLA context. 158
Even though the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not created
specifically for the FMLA context and was written before the exis
tence of the FMLA, this does not defeat its relevance. The Secre
tary of Labor specifically chose the ADA regulations to define
disability in the FMLA context because they most accurately repre
sented congressional intent with respect to the definition of disabil
ity in the FMLA.159 In addition, the majority's characterization of
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance as "idiosyncratic" is irrelevant. If
the court accepts as legitimate rule making the reference to the
ADA regulations 16°-also written before Congress passed the
FMLA-it follows that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, too, is
legitimate. Section 1630.2 is the only section of the ADA refer
enced by the FMLA regulations, and the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance relates to this particular section. Furthermore, contrary to
the court's assertion, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance's applicabil
ity in the FMLA context did go through the notice-and-comment
procedure. 161
circular logic of the Navarro court presupposed a result for all informal interpretations
of statutes promulgated by agencies." Womack, supra note 134, at 331.
156. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99, 100.
157. !d. at 100 ("[Ilt has little consistency with other EEOC pronouncements on
the FMLA as the EEOC has made no such pronouncements.").
158. Id. at 99-100.
159. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.A.1.
160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
161. See Part LB.
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The Navarro court's second argument for rejecting Skidmore
deference took the position that no one of the three factors should
have a "talismanic effect. "162 To support this position, the court
cited Supreme Court precedent in ADA cases that required an indi
vidualized assessment of the existence of a disability in the ADA
context. Specifically, the First Circuit examined the Supreme
Court's analysis in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. 163 and concluded
that the Court's attention to the present indicative verb tense of the
phrase "substantially limits" designates a point of reference that
"militates against according talismanic effect to factors such as du
ration and long-term impact."164 Because the Supreme Court com
manded that the ADA inquiry evaluate an individual's current
condition, the First Circuit rejected the view that all three factors
had to be satisfied to some extent. The First Circuit argued that
consideration of the duration and long-term impact factors requires
a factfinder to "hypothesize" about the future condition of the
impairment. 165
Contrary to the First Circuit's assertion, Sutton does not com
pel the court's conclusions. In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated
only that a reviewing court make the determination of disability
through an "individualized inquiry"166 that "a person be pres
ently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in
order to demonstrate a disability."167 The context of this latter
statement is that a court's analysis of the existence of an individ
ual's disability considers the corrective measures taken by the indi
vidual.168 Thus, Sutton's holding does not support the First
Circuit's conclusion that all the enumerated factors need not be
162. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101. See also note 105 and accompanying text. Fur
thermore, that the court turned to ADA precedent to evaluate the language of the
referenced regulations demonstrates the court's deference to the ADA regulations in
the FMLA context. Id. at 96-98, 100.
163. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). See supra note 145 & infra note 168 (discussing Sutton).
164. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100-01.
165. /d. at 101.
166. By "individualized inquiry," the Supreme Court intends that a person's diag
nosis of a particular condition is not the controlling factor in the determination of a
disability. Because the same diagnosis in two individuals can nonetheless result in
symptoms that vary widely with respect to severity and duration, a case-by-case assess
ment of the effects of an impairment is necessary. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v.
Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692 (2002).
167. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
168. In Sutton, the plaintiffs argued that their severe myopia should qualify as a
disability under the ADA in spite of the fact that their glasses corrected their vision to
20/20 or better because the determination of a disability is made without considering
corrective measures. Id. at 481. The Court rejected this argument and determined that
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present.169
Moreover, a recent Supreme Court ADA case, Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,no directly opposes the
First Circuit's conclusion that the duration and long-term impact
factors need not be present for a determination of "disability." The
Court's holding was based on an analysis of section 1630.20)(2) of
the ADA regulations-the section referenced by the FMLA regula
tions. In its holding, the Court stated, "The impairment's impact
must also be permanent or 10ng-term."171 This statement indicates
that a court's analysis of the existence of a disability must include
the consideration of all three factors: severity, duration, and long
term impact. Moreover, the Court also considered the EEOC In
terpretive Guidance in its analysis. Therefore, though each disabil
ity inquiry is performed on a case-by-case basis because the factors
may differ in significance from person to person, each factor-in
cluding duration and long-term impact-should be accounted for in
some manner.
The last argument offered by the court contends that the dif
ferences between the ADA and the FMLA illustrate how the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance clashes with the underlying purpose
of the FMLA.172 However, the majority's interpretation of the pur
pose of the FMLA is not an accurate characterization of congres
sional intent.1 73 Though the stated purpose of the FMLA is
"preserving family integrity," the authoritative language of the stat
ute is not so broad. Congress limited "family" in the language of
the FMLA; some relatives who are within the ordinary usage of the
term "family" are not included. 174 For instance, an employee may
not take time off to care for a sibling or a grandparent, although a
seriously ill sibling or grandparent 175 presents a distressing situation
the proper disability inquiry examined the present state of the condition, including any
corrective measures taken and their impact on the individual's condition. Id. at 482.
169. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101.
170. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The Court in Toyota Motor addressed "what a plaintiff
must demonstrate to establish a substantial limitation in the specific major life activity
of performing manual tasks." Id. at 196.
171. Id. at 196.
172. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101.
173. For a discussion of the majority's interpretation of the purpose of the
FMLA, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text; for a discussion of the legislative
history of the FMLA, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. Grandparents who are the primary caretakers of their grandchildren would
qualify under the FMLA because they are fulfilling the role of the parent. H.R. Rep.
No. 103-8, at 34 ("In choosing this definitional language, the committee intends that the
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that seems deserving of coverage by the FMLA.
Similarly, Congress limited the class of children who fall under
the auspices of the FMLA. The language of the FMLA states that
the adult child of an employee is only covered when the adult child
has a serious health condition and is incapable of self-care because
of mental or physical disabilityP6 In crafting the language of the
statute, Congress intended to limit the number of adult children
who qualify under the FMLA. The court must give effect to the
unambiguous language of the statute,177 regardless of the stated
purpose of the Act.
In summary, none of the First Circuit's arguments against ac
cording deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance stand;
therefore, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance has persuasive
power, it warrants, at minimum, Skidmore deference. This is espe
cially true since deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance of
the ADA regulations is not simply deference to an agency that "has
expertise in a field that bears some relation to the statute at issue,"
as the First Circuit described it.178 By referencing the ADA regula
tions instead of incorporating its language directly into the FMLA
regulations, the Secretary referenced the agency with expertise in
the field. 179 Congress did not intend self-sufficient adult children
with serious health conditions to be covered under the FMLA. In
selecting the ADA definition to define disability in the FMLA con
text, the Secretary of Labor chose a definition that provided the
restrictive meaning Congress intended. Thus, even under the Skid
more doctrine, the Navarro court should have adopted the EEOC
Interpretive Guidance as an accurate test for determining the exis
tence of a disability.
3.

Seminole Rock Deference

As Congress continues to enact statutes that cover more areas
terms "parent" and "son or daughter" be broadly construed to ensure that an employee
who actually has day-to-day responsibility for caring for a child is entitled to leave even
if the employee does not have a biological or legal relationship to that child.").
176. An employee's minor child does not face this added restriction; instead a
minor child faces the same requirement that the employee's spouse and parent face: a
serious health condition. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting) ("Notably,
the statute imposes no such disability limitation in respect to leaves to care for minor
children, spouses and parents.").
177. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see Part
1I1.A.1 (discussing Chevron deference).
178. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99.
179. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 c.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000).
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of employment life, there is bound to be overlap in the terms
used.1 80 Where there is overlap, it is reasonable, efficient, and ef
fective for authorized agencies to cross-reference the definitions
and regulations of other statutes. As Judge Campbell stated in his
dissent in Navarro: "The ... cross-reference to the ADA's defini
tion of 'disability' with its concomitant history and administrative
and judicial guidance makes it possible for employers, employees
and tribunals interpreting the FMLA to refer to well-established
coherent principles and precedent ...."181
When an agency refers to other regulations, the referenced
regulations should be entitled to the same deference as the agency's
own regulations; As applied to Navarro, if the referencing regula
tions are entitled to Chevron deference (because the FMLA was
ambiguous with respect to the definition of disability and Secretary
of Labor had the authority to issue regulations, which were not
manifestly contrary to the FMLA), the referenced ADA regula
tions would also be entitled to Chevron deference. The standard of
deference applicable to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, however,
is an open question.
Commentators have argued that Chevron deference should be
limited to "interpretations rendered in legislative rules and binding
adjudications."182 Thus, unless an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is a result of a notice-and-comment rule making proce
dure or of a binding adjudication, the agency's interpretation would
not be subject to Chevron deference. Because the EEOC Interpre
tive Guidance was not initially issued as part of one of the two
above-mentioned processes, it would not warrant Chevron defer
ence-despite the fact that in the FMLA context the EEOC Inter
pretive Guidance was subject to the notice-and-comment
procedure. 183 Although the First Circuit only considered Chevron
and Skidmore deference, there are other levels of deference that
may be applicable, as recognized by two recent Supreme Court
cases.
In U.S. v. Mead Corp. ,184 the Supreme Court affirmed the con
180. See, e.g., John A. Ricca, Disability Leave Alphabet Soup: ADA, FMLA,
CFRA and WC, 527 PLI/LIT 745 (Sept.-Oct. 1995) (discussing the overlap in coverage
between the FMLA, the ADA, and Workers' Compensation).
181. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 108.
182. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 900; see also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
183. See supra Part III.A.1.
184. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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tinuing relevance of the Skidmore standard of deference and recog
nized that there exists a range of judicial deference.1 85 Mead
encourages courts to tailor deference to the variety of statutory au
thority that Congress intends. 186 Thus, the First Circuit should have
considered other alternatives in fashioning its deference analysis of
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.
For example, the Seminole Rock standard of deference applies
to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. 187
It requires that an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous reg
ulations should be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsis
tent with the regulation. "188 The Supreme Court recently revisited
the issue of what deference is due to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations in Auer v. Robbins.1 89 In Auer, the Court con
sidered whether to enforce the Secretary of Labor's interpretation
of regulations issued by the Department of Labor for the Fair La
bor Standards Act of 1938. 190 The Court determined that the Sec
retary's interpretation should stand 191 after applying the Seminole
Rock standard. 192 Later, in Christensen v. Harris,193 the Court clar
ified the application of this standard, stating, "Auer deference [also
known as Seminole Rock deference] is warranted only when the
language of the regulation is ambiguous."194
185. Id. at 235.
186. Id. at 238-39.
187. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (stating that
in interpreting an administrative regulation, though "the intention of Congress or the
principles of the Constitution ... may be relevant in the first instance in choosing be
tween various constructions ... the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpreta
tion, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 899 (discussing the Semi
nole Rock standard of deference and its application to cases where courts are evaluat
ing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations).
188. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 899; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452,461 (1997) (stating that, when evaluating an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation, the agency's "interpretation of it, under our jurisprudence, is controlling
unless ... 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation'" (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))).
189. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
190. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (2000).
191. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
192. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,359
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945»).
193. 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that the Department of Labor's interpretation
in an opinion letter of the regulations for the Fair Labor Standards Act was not entitled
to Auer [Seminole Rock] deference because the underlying regulation was not
ambiguous).
194. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
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Under the Seminole Rock deference standard, if a court faces
an agency interpretation of its own regulation, the court must deter
mine whether the regulation is ambiguous. If the regulation is un
ambiguous, then the agency's interpretation is irrelevant, and the
court must simply give effect to the language of the regulation.
Thus, a court need not address or consider the agency's interpreta
tion. However, where the regulation is ambiguous, then a court has
reason to evaluate the agency's interpretation.
In Navarro, the First Circuit Court confronted an agency's in
terpretation of its own regulations: the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance issued for the ADA regulations. If the First Circuit
concluded that the referenced language in the ADA regulations
were entitled to Chevron deference-as the First Circuit Court im
plicitly concluded-then there are only two subsequent avenues of
analysis: either the ADA regulations were ambiguous, or they were
not. If the regulations were not ambiguous, as the majority
claimed,195 then the court had no reason to turn to the EEOC Inter
pretive Guidance. As required by Seminole Rock deference, the
court in Navarro needed only give effect to the unambiguous lan
guage of the regulation.
Despite concluding that the ADA regulations were unambigu
OUS,196 the First Circuit proceeded to evaluate the EEOC Interpre
tive Guidance. This methodology is the key flaw in the court's
deference analysis. If the regulations were not ambiguous, then the
court should have given effect to the clear language of the regula
tions. Accordingly, all three of the factors, pursuant to the ADA
regulations, should have been present in the court's analysis. 197 On
the other hand, if the ADA regulations were ambiguous, then the
court would necessarily turn to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.
However, a reviewing court can disregard the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance only if the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or incon
sistent" with the ADA regulation. Generally, a referenced agency's
interpretive guidance of its own regulations warrants deference in
the context of the referencing agency's regulations.
In conclusion, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance went
through notice-and-comment procedures, the First Circuit should
have considered it a formal agency interpretation and applied
Chevron deference. Thus, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance would
195. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 103 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001).
196. Id.
197. See infra notes 200, 207 and accompanying text.
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have been controlling. If, however, the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance could only be considered an informal interpretation, then
under Skidmore deference, the Navarro court should have found
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance persuasive. Finally, in the alter
native, the First Circuit could have applied the standard of defer
ence recognized in Seminole Rock. This doctrine of· deference
applies specifically to agency interpretations of its own ambiguous
regulations. Application of any of these standards of deference
should have resulted in the Navarro court using the EEOC Inter
pretive Guidance in its analysis and, therefore, applying all three
factors in its determination of the existence of a disability.
B.

The Definition of Disability

In addition to the misapplication of deference standards, the
First Circuit disregarded additional reasons to define disability nar
rowly under the FMLA. For an employee to qualify for unpaid
leave to care for an adult child, the adult child must first be incapa
ble of self-care because of physical or mental disability and also
have a serious health condition. 198 Congress intended the term disa
bility to have a narrow and restrictive definition in order to limit to
a small class the number of adult children who qualify under the
FMLA provisions.1 99 However, the First Circuit's holding in
Navarro frustrates Congress' intent by constructing a broad defini
tion of disability that severely diminishes the significance of the
term.
Part One of this section demonstrates how, in fashioning a new
tripartite rule under the ADA regulations for determining the exis
tence of a disability, the First Circuit created a rule that ignores the
plain language of the ADA's regulations. Part Two explains how
the court's new rule significantly diminishes the impact that Con
gress intended the word disability to have in the statute. With its
tripartite rule, the court construes the term disability in such a man
ner as to duplicate the meaning of other terms in the FMLA.
1.

Reading the Text of the ADA Regulations as Written

The First Circuit's analysis to determine whether Ms. Navarro's
daughter had a disability resulted in the court constructing a rule
that abrogates the language of the ADA regulations. The ADA reg
ulations list three factors that should be considered when determin
198. 29 U.S.c. §§ 2612(a)(1)(c), 2611(12) (2000).
199. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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ing whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a
major life activity: (1) "the nature and severity of the impairment,"
(2) "the duration ... of the impairment," and (3) "the permanent or
long-term impact . . . resulting from the impairment. "200 The
EEOC Interpretive Guidance expounds on the application of these
three factors to determine the existence of a disability, stating that
"temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little
or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not
disabilities. "201
The First Circuit uses the existence of the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance as an avenue by which to refashion the ADA regulations.
In determining that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance is not persua
sive in the FMLA context,202 the majority concludes that all three
factors do not have to be weighed equally: courts should assess
whether an adult child's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity on a case-by-case basis, balancing all three factors plus "any
other relevant factors," with no one factor, apart from the severity
of the impairment, being indispensable to finding that a disability
exists for FMLA purposes. 203 Thus, the majority allows the dura
tion and long-term impact factors to be absent altogether while still
allowing a finding of disability.
Regardless of whether the EEOC Interpretive Guidance is ap
plicable in the FMLA context, a court cannot fashion a test that
contradicts an agency's regulations unless the court strikes down
those regulations. 204 The court in Navarro implicitly found the Sec
retary's FMLA regulations to be valid. 205 Since the FMLA regula
tions reference the ADA regulations, the ADA regulations are also
valid. Even so, the First Circuit created and applied its balancing
test in direct conflict with the plain language of the referenced
ADA regulations. The language of the ADA regulations provides
that three factors should to be considered, and uses the conjunction
"and."206 When a regulation lists a series using the conjunction
"and," all elements of the series are relevant to the inquiry.207
200. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2002).
201. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
202. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning on why no deference is war
ranted, see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text, as well as Part 1I1.A.1, .A.2.
203. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 104.
204. See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part I1I.A.I.
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text, Part III.B.I.
207. The word "and" indicates mandatory inclusion. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN
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Thus, all three factors in the ADA's regulations must be present in a
court's determination of whether a disability exists. Otherwise, the
court is, in effect, striking down those regulations.
Furthermore, the First Circuit's inclusion of "other relevant
factors" violates the standard canon of interpretation that the ex
pression of one thing is the exclusion of others.208 The First Cir
cuit's test requires that courts, in determining whether an
impairment substantially limits an individual's major life activities,
consider the three factors listed in the ADA regulations 209 plus
"any other relevant factors."210 The ADA regulations state that
"[t]he following factors should be considered," and then proceed to
list three factors. The explicit listing of three factors precludes
other factors from also being considered. 211 The First Circuit was
not free to add the fourth factor, "any other relevant factors."212
In support of its conclusion that the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance is not persuasive, the First Circuit also argues that Supreme
Court jurisprudence provides that the three factors in the ADA reg
ulations need not be given equal weight in every case. 213 Specifi
cally, the court relies on a footnote in which the Supreme Court
states that in a multifactor weighing process, "every consideration
need not be equally applicable to each individual case."214 The
First Circuit's application of its own test, however, confers no
weight to two of the three factors.215 A court may not be required
to weigh all three factors equally, but all three factors should be
accounted for in some fashion. 216
The First Circuit should have applied the ADA regulations as
they are written, considering all three factors in the determination
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 80 (Philip B. Gove, ed., 3d ed. 1993) (defining "and" as
"also at the same time"). The word "or" is disjunctive and indicates alternatives or
optional inclusion. Id. at 1585 (defining "or" as indicating a choice between); see also
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKLEY, GARRETT, LEGISLATION & STATUTORY INTER
PRETATION 266, at 375 (Foundation Press 2000).
208. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 207, at 375 (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius).
209. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (severity of impairment, duration, and long
term or permanent impact).
210. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2001).
211. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (explaining the canon
expresio unius, and refusing its application to the statute at hand); see supra note 149
(presenting the facts of Christensen).
212. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 104.
213. Id.
214. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978).
215. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 111 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
216. ESKRIDGE & ET AL., supra note 207, at 375.
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of a disability. When a court evaluates the ADA regulations as they
are written, the term disability retains the restrictive ADA defini
tion that Congress intended the term to have in the FMLA context.
In ignoring the duration and long-term impact factors, the First Cir
cuit deprives the term disability of its proper meaning in the
FMLA.
2.

Reading the Term Disability Out of the Act

Additionally, the First Circuit's interpretation reduces the de
termination of a disability to the one factor of severity. Conse
quently, there is no practical difference between a serious health
condition and a disability. This result is contrary to a standard ca
non of statutory construction directing courts to interpret a term in
a way such that it does not duplicate other terms in the statute.
Furthermore, the First Circuit's analysis disregards congressional
intent as to how disability should be construed, as well as the spe
cific purpose of the disability requirement for adult children.
One standard canon of interpretation applies where a term has
a well-established meaning: Congress is presumed to intend that
meaning when it uses the term in subsequent legislation. 217 In
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Supreme Court reviewed the stat
utory scheme of the ADA to determine what evidence a plaintiff
must show in order to establish a substantial limitation in a specific
major life activity.21s The Court reviewed the legislative history of
the ADA and noted that the definition of disability was drawn "al
most verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' in
the Rehabilitation Act. "219 In explaining why the definition of disa
bility would be interpreted as the definition of "handicapped indi
vidual," the Court stated, ". . . Congress' repetition of a well
established term generally implies that Congress intended the term
to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpre
tations."22o Therefore, Congress should be presumed to have in
tended the FMLA term disability to be construed as it has been in
the ADA.
Furthermore, the diluted definition given to disability equates
217. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-94 (2002). See
supra note 170 for a discussion of the issues in this case.
218. Id. at 195-96.
219. Id. at 193; see 29 U.S.c. § 705(9)(B) (2000).
220. Toyota Motor Mfg. 534 U.S. at 193-94 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 631 (1998); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); and ICC v.
Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945».
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the term to serious health condition. Children over the age of eigh
teen must suffer from a serious health condition and meet the ad
ded requirement of being incapable of self-care because of a
physical disability. By creating a rule that diminishes the impact of
two of the three factors listed in the ADA regulations-the regula
tions referenced by the FMLA regulation-the majority removed
the effect of the second requirement imposed on adult children. To
qualify as a serious health condition, a child's physical or mental
condition must be an illness, injury, or impairment that rises to the
minimum level of requiring "continuing treatment by a health care
provider."221 With only severity to consider, courts may find that
an adult child's impairment that meets the definition of serious
health condition might also meet the definition of disability. Con
sequently, the term disability no longer has independent signifi
cance because a severe health condition may also provide the
severity factor necessary for an impairment to be considered a disa
bility. Thus, the First Circuit violated a standard canon of construc
tion by interpreting the term disability in a manner that duplicates
the meaning of another term in the statute-specifically, serious
health condition. 222
The First Circuit justified this interpretation by arguing that
since not all serious health conditions would satisfy the severity re
quirement, the definition of disability still retained meaningful con
sequences in the FMLA.223 It is possible that some adult children's
serious health conditions may not be found to have a character se
vere enough to satisfy the definition of disability. However, the
First Circuit's interpretation and subsequent application of the term
disability blurs the difference between the requirement of having a
serious health condition and being incapable of self-care because of
disability. Courts generally interpret statutory terms so that each
term "adds something to the [statute's] regulatory impact."224 In
Navarro, the First Circuit interprets disability in a manner that
221. 29 c.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2). Normal maladies, such as colds and earaches, do
not satisfy the definition of serious health condition. § 825.114(c).
222. This canon is known as the rule against surplusage. Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1995); Navarro, 261 F.3d at
106 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (quoting Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt,
194 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 1999) ("All words and provisions of a statute are intended to
have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which
would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous."».
223. Navarro, 261 F.3d 90, 103 (1st Cir. 2001).
224. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 207, at 266; Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697
98.
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barely narrows the class of adult children who have serious health
conditions.
Finally, the structure of the statute indicates that Congress in
tended the descriptive phrase "incapable of self-care because of
physical disability" as a precursor to the "serious health condition."
Whether an employee can take time off to care for an individual
with a serious health condition depends on the relationship that ex
ists between the employee and the individual. If the individual is a
parent or a spouse, then the employee qualifies for leave. If the
individual is a child, however, a reviewing court must first deter
mine if the individual fits the FMLA definition of child.
The disability requirement is definitional: if the individual in
question is an adult child, he or she must first be "incapable of self
care because of physical disability." Only after a reviewing court
has determined that the individual meets this definition can the
court consider whether the child has a serious health condition. As
the relationship of parent, spouse, or minor child exists before the
onset of the serious health condition, so must the adult child's inca
pacity exist before the onset of a serious health condition. Thus,
the adult child's disability cannot be the same as the adult child's
serious health condition without vitiating the added requirement
for adult children. For these reasons, the First Circuit's interpreta
tion of the term disability does not effectuate Congress' intent.
CONCLUSION

In crafting the FMLA, Congress included the term disability
but did not explicitly define it. Instead, it empowered the Secretary
of Labor to promulgate regulations for the statute. The Secretary,
pursuant to this authority, properly promulgated regulations which
borrowed the definition of disability from the ADA regulations
and, for further clarification of the definition's key terms, refer
enced the ADA regulations and the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.
The plain language of the regulations clearly requires a more re
strictive definition of disability than that set forth by the Navarro
court. Furthermore, Congress' intent, as ascertained through ca
nons of statutory construction and an examination of legislative his
tory, also requires a more narrow meaning.
The First Circuit should have given Chevron deference to the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance because the FMLA regulation's ref
erence to it went through the requisite APA notice-and-comment
procedures. Even if Chevron deference was not warranted, the
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court should have given deference to the EEOC Interpretive Gui
dance under either Skidmore or Seminole Rock. This issue of ac
cording deference is critical because the essential difference
between the majority's and dissent's definition of disability hinged
upon the majority's disregard of the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.
In disregarding the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the First
Circuit created its own rule for determining the existence of a disa
bility in the FMLA context. The court's rule adds the fourth factor,
"any other relevant factors," to the three factors enumerated in the
regulations. 225 The court also directs lower courts that only the se
verity factor is conclusive in determining whether a particular im
pairment rises to the level of disability,226 making the duration and
long-term impact factors dispensable. It is this approach that ulti
mately distorts the meaning of disability in the context of the
FMLA. It is, after all, the duration of the children's impairments
that separates the circumstances facing Ms. Cho from those facing
Mr. Rivera. In time, Mr. Rivera's daughter will recover from her
broken leg; Ms. Cho's son, however, is dependent on care for the
rest of his life. Duration and long-term impact, essential in the de
termination of disability in the ADA context, are essential in the
FMLA context as well.
Jennifer Hotchkiss Kaplan

225. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2U)(2)
(listing nature and severity, duration, and long-term impact as the three factors to
consider).
226. Id.

